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Ranking Swing Voters in Congressional Elections
Abstract
We present a model for quantitatively identifying swing voters in congressional elections. 
This is achieved by predicting an individual voter's likelihood to vote and an individual 
voter's likelihood to vote for a given party, if he votes. We make a rough prediction of these
values. We then update these predictions by incorporating information on a municipality 
wide basis via aggregate data to enhance our estimate under the assumption that nearby 
voters have similar behavior, which could be due to social interaction or common external 
factors. Finally, we use a ranking scheme on these predictions to identify two key types of 
voter: 1) Voters who are likely to vote that we can convince to vote for a given party; and, 
2) Voters who are likely to vote for a given party, if they vote, that we can convince to 
actually turn out to vote. Once these voters have been identified, a political campaign can 
use this information to micro-target voters and win more votes.
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1. Introduction
Candidates in a given election employ a multitude of tactics to win votes. Whether 
they use methods such as polling or direct phone calls to potential voters, these 
candidates try to discern a voter's voting preferences and lock in as many potential votes 
as possible. While it is important to pay attention to all voters that will likely support you, 
emphasis should be placed on the swing voters in the election, since it is generally the 
swing voters that determine the outcome of an election (Gelman, Silver, Edlin, 2012). 
Since a campaign's objective is to maximize votes in a given election, this becomes a 
problem of identifying and ranking swing voters.
Identifying and ranking swing voters involves determining as accurately as possible 
the voting preferences for each voter. The importance of swing voters has long been 
known in political campaigns, and the emergence of Big Data allows ever more accurate 
predictions of a voter's voting preferences. This allows for a transition from a qualitative 
judgment to a more quantitative prediction of how a voter may vote. President Obama's 
Project Narwhal was a major appearance of Big Data applied to voter turn out. Although 
Project Narwhal in its entirety is beyond scope of this thesis, the underlying ideas can be 
implemented on a smaller scale and still be useful. As discussed in a recent Wired 
(Salmon, 2014) article, “It's increasingly clear that for smart organizations, living by 
numbers alone simply won't work. That's why they arrive at stage four: synthesis – the 
practice of marrying quantitative insight with old-fashioned subjective experience.” That is 
precisely our intention in this thesis: use mathematical principles to make quantitative 
predictions, then enhance them via Bayesian inference with intuition discerned from 
empirical results.
Our objective in this thesis is to identify the most persuadable swing voters in 
Congressional campaigns and we will achieve this by ranking these voters. Part of doing 
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this will involve trying to discern the party preference for unaffiliated voters. As we will 
discuss later, people behave differently depending on if its a Congressional, Presidential or
off-year election. In this thesis, we will focus on Congressional campaigns and specifically 
use data from the 5th Congressional District of Connecticut to develop our model. To 
achieve our objective, we need to quantitatively describe the preferences of our voters.  
This is done by using the data set to assign them probability measures on likelihood to 
vote and likelihood to vote for a given party if they vote.  We develop a model that makes 
as precise of a prediction as possible given the data for these values. This model is chiefly 
influenced by rational  choice theory, statistical mechanics applied to socioeconomic 
phenomena, and Bayes' Rule. It should be noted that our final aim is not to predict the 
actual probabilities of each voter but, instead, probabilities that make sense on a relative 
basis to one another so we can implement an effective ranking scheme.  Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier emphasize this point on their treatment of Big Data: “What we 
lose in accuracy at the micro level, we gain in insight at the macro level”  (Mayer-
Schönberger,  Cukier 14). It is the intuition we get from the numbers that is significant, not 
the numbers themselves.  
In the end, this is a practical project, with an aim to get real, usable results. To 
develop the intuition and as a proof of concept, the model was implemented in Microsoft 
Excel.  The implementation of the model is not overly sophisticated, but the math that 
underlies the model is non-trivial. As discussed in Myerson's (2005) coverage of economic 
modeling, Microsoft Excel is a powerful tool in the implementation of statistical models.
This thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we describe the data used 
underlying the model. In chapter 3, we explain the development of the model. In chapter 4,
we discuss the ranking scheme used to identify swing voters. In chapter 5, we present the 
end results of the model and their implications. In chapter 6, we touch upon the theoretical 
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underpinnings of our model. Finally, chapter 7 covers concluding thoughts and areas that 
model can be improved upon.
2. Data
The data used is drawn from the Connecticut Voter File, which is a list, made 
available by the State of Connecticut, that contains data about each registered voter in the 
state. In our model, we used the 5th Congressional District portion of the Connecticut voter 
file. There are 396,769 total voters spread over 41 towns in this district. In this data set, 
each voter is identified by their full name, which we have replaced with a voter id tag. Each
voter has demographic information including city, zip, sex and date of birth.  The party 
affiliation of each voter is given, and can be either Democrat (DEM), Republican (REP), or 
unaffiliated (UNA). The voting history (whether or not they've voted) for each year's 
general election from 2002 to 2012 is given for each voter. 2012, 2008 and 2004 elections 
were Presidential. 2010, 2006, and 2002 elections were Congressional. 2011, 2009, 2007, 
and 2005 elections were off-year. A random sample of 5 voters from the data set is shown 
below:
District-wide, 54.7% of registered voters are female and 45.6% are male. The voters
are split between parties as follows: 126,768 (31.95%)  Democrats, 93,795 (23.64%)  
Republicans, and 176,206 (44.41%) unaffiliated. The breakdown is heterogeneous 
amongst the different municipalities. The difference in the number of Republicans 
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VOTER_ID CITY ZIP SEX DOB PARTY 2012 2011 2010 … 2006 2005 2004
3482 Danbury 06810 F 1972-11-21 UNA YES YES YES YES
328203 Middlebury 06762 M 1958-03-04 REP YES YES
47203 Meriden 06450 F 1986-04-23 DEM YES
173812 Litchfield 06759 M 1955-09-01 UNA YES YES YES YES YES
275024 New Britain 06052 M 1956-03-27 UNA YES YES
94024 Waterbury 06708 F 1991-11-24 UNA YES YES
compared to Democrats in these towns can be as small as 1-2% or as large as 10-15%. 
Most towns have more unaffiliated voters than any other type of voters, but the proportion 
of unaffiliated voters ranges from roughly 35% to 50%. For example, voters in Waterbury 
are 49% Democrat, 12% Republican and 39% unaffiliated, but voters in Bantam are much 
more evenly distributed with 25% Democrats, 23% Republicans, and 51% unaffiliated. 
Average voter turnout was 71% for Presidential elections, 51% for Congressional 
elections, and 38% for off-year elections.
3. The Model
The objective of our model is to identify swing voters in the 5th Congressional district
of Connecticut in the next Congressional race, which will be held in 2014. We identify 
these swing voters via a ranking scheme. To do this, we need an estimate of an 
individual's probability to vote and probability to vote for a given party, if he votes. 
Throughout the model, we arbitrarily assume the objective is to win votes for the 
Democratic candidate and all the probabilities will be expressed in terms of predicting 
Democratic turnout. We will refer to individual i's probability to vote in 2014 as p i,2014(Vote) 
and individual i's probability to vote Democrat in 2014, if he votes, as p i,2014(Vote D | Vote). 
Note that the same analysis holds if the Democratic candidate was replaced with a 
Republican candidate. In this case, the values can either be calculated directly from the 
data or derived from the pi,2014(Vote D | Vote) by noting that pi,2014(Vote D | Vote) + 
pi,2014(Vote R | Vote) = 1. That is, our model assumes if a voter votes he will either voter 
Democrat or Republican, so these probabilities must sum to one. 1 To obtain these values, 
we construct a model chiefly influenced by rational choice theory, socioeconomic 
application of statistics mechanics, and Bayesian inference. Abstractly, our model is rather 
1 Likewise, it is important to note that since the probability to vote and probability not to vote must sum to 
one, we have: pi,2014(Abstain) = 1 - pi,2014(Vote)
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straightforward. We use the data to make a rough guess of each individual's prior 
probability. Once calculated, we will aggregate these probabilities on a municipality wide 
basis. Then, we use a principled update scheme on the individual priors to incorporate the 
information contained in the aggregates and obtain each individual's posterior probability 
estimates.
To calculate the prior probability to vote, we draw upon the voting history from our 
data set. As shown in the section above, the turnout averages are drastically different for 
each type of election (Presidential, Congressional, and off years). Since our model is 
concerned only with Congressional elections, we only consider results from Congressional
years; that is, we are calculating pi,2014(Vote | Congressional Year), which is the probability 
of voting, conditioned on it being a Congressional year. However, since we are only 
concerned with Congressional years, for ease of notation, we will refer to this simply as 
pi,2014(Vote). We calculate this as follows:
pi,2014(Vote) = (# of votes + εv) / (# of eligible votes + 1)           εv  (0,1)∈
where “# of votes” is the total number of times individual i voted in a Congressional 
election, “# of eligible votes” is the total number times individual i was eligible to vote in 
past Congressional elections. We consider a voter eligible to vote by using his year of birth
to check if he is of legal age (18) to vote in a given election. Note that p i,2014(Vote) is 
essentially the frequency that individual i voted in past Congressional elections; however, 
voting in none or all of the elections would lead to probabilities of 0 or 1, which are not well
defined. Placing εv in the numerator allows us to perturb the frequency such that the 
resulting values are valid probabilities between 0 and 1 (non-inclusive). Since priors are 
only a rough estimates to our probabilities, we choose εv such that the model's predicted 
probabilities are reasonably close to the empirical results. 2This yields εv  = .9.
2 To calculate εv and εp we need to compare the model's predicted probabilities to empirical results. The 
empirical results are available on the Connecticut Secretary of the State's website (www.ct.gov/sots/). 
Due to limitations of the excel spreadsheet used to implement the model, we used a 10,000 sample 
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To calculate the prior probability to vote for a given party if a voter votes, we draw 
upon the voter's party affiliation from our data set. We assume that each voter can be 
registered either Democrat, denoted DEM, Republican, denoted REP, or unaffiliated, 
denoted UNA. If this voter votes, he votes either for the Republican candidate or the 
Democratic candidate. The probability voter i votes for a certain party is calculated as 
following: 
Pi,2014(Vote D | Vote) = .5 + εp if registered DEM; εp   [0,.5)∈
.5 – εp if registered REP; 
.5 if registered UNA
By construction, we assume that a voter is likely to vote for their party of affiliation, but not 
with certainty, and that an unaffiliated voter is equally likely to vote for either party. For 
simplicity and symmetry, we use the same εp  all party affiliations. εp can be thought of as a 
measure of how strong we believe one's party affiliation actually is. We used the same 
method to calibrate the value of εp as we did with εv. For our analysis, we chose εp = .4. 
While this interpretation is a bit extreme, choosing εp = .4 helped keep the results 
consistent the election outcomes.
The next step is to aggregate the data in such a way that it can be used to update 
our prior probabilities. The tendency of individuals to associate with others who are similar 
to themselves, known as homophily, is the idea that underpins our aggregating. The data  
shows that when people are broken down geographically into smaller groups they tend to 
have similar voting behavior and party preferences. Because empirical data is most readily
available in a format broken down by municipalities, we choose this as our basis to split 
the data and aggregate over.3 The aggregate predicted probability to vote in 2014 for 
subset of the full data set. The samples were chosen randomly to maintain the heterogeneity of the full 
data set and roughly keep the same proportion of voters from each municipality. We then calibrated εv and
εp  by tweaking their values until the average pi,2014(Vote) and pi,2014(Vote D | Vote) aligned with the past 
actual election results.
3 Note that if we had data broken down by zip, we could aggregate over zip instead of municipality.
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voters living in municipality m is denoted pm, 2014(Vote) and the aggregate predicted 
probability to vote Democrat if a voter votes in 2014 for voters living in municipality m is 
denoted pm, 2014(Vote D | Vote). We calculate these as follows:
pm, 2014(Vote) = ∑
i∈m
pi ,2014 (Vote)
N m
pm, 2014(Vote D | Vote) = 
∑
i∈m
pi ,2014 (VoteD |Vote)
N m
where Nm is the number of voters in municipality m and the summation is over each of the 
voters in municipality m. In other words, these are the average probabilities for the voters 
in municipality m.
The final step in the model is to update the prior probabilities using the aggregate 
probabilities to obtain the posterior probabilities. Although our updating scheme is in the 
style of Bayesian inference, it is not a direct application of Bayes' rule. Instead, it is a 
principled updating scheme using arithmetic means. The update allows us to integrate the 
information about social consideration contained in our aggregate probabilities into our 
individual probabilities. We denote the posterior, updated likelihood to vote for individual i 
as p'i,2014(Vote) and the posterior, updated likelihood of a voter to vote democrat if he votes 
as p'i,2014(Vote D | Vote). We calculate these as follows:
p'i,2014(Vote) = ½ (pi,2014(Vote) + pm, 2014(Vote)) 
p'i,2014(Vote D | Vote) = ½ (p'i,2014(Vote D | Vote) + pm, 2014(Vote D | Vote)) 
where m is the municipality where voter i lives. The posterior probabilities are simply 
averages of the prior probability and the aggregate probability of the municipality where 
that voter lives. We chose to use the arithmetic mean of these two numbers so that the 
laws of probability hold. Specifically, by using the arithmetic mean, p' i,2014(Vote D | Vote) 
and p'i,2014(Vote R | Vote) must sum to 1, just as the priors did.
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When we update p'i,2014(Vote D | Vote) this enhances our estimation of which party a 
voter would vote for, if he votes. As the data shows, some municipalities have a very large 
percentage of unaffiliated voters. The way we define the priors reflects the fact that we 
have no information to indicate which way an unaffiliated voter will vote, so we simply 
assume it is equal for either party. This update is particularly useful to help discern which 
party the unaffiliated voters will likely align with, because it updates each individual voters 
probability with information derived from other voters in the same municipality.
 4. Ranking Voters
Now that we have developed the model and applied it to our data to yield 
probabilities for each voter, we move on to the final step of ranking each of these voters. In
our interpretation, we are not interested in a prediction of a voter's actual preferences; 
instead, they are relevant when looked at relative to each other. Ultimately, the ranking of 
voters is useful to a campaign because it gives a mathematical sound quantification of the 
individual voters that can will be most effectively targeted while campaigning.
Throughout this thesis, we have focused on calculating two quantities for a given 
voter: The likelihood of a given voter to actually vote, P i,2014(Vote) and, if he votes, the 
likelihood for this voter to vote for a given party, P i,2014(Vote D | Vote). The types of voters 
we are concerned with are support voters and swing voters, which can be broken down 
into turnout swing voters and persuasion swing voters. Support voters are those likely to 
support the party through activities such as donating, volunteering, or fund raising. These 
voters will near certainly turn out to vote and vote for the party they support; thus, they are 
not swing voters  We define a turnout swing voter as a voter who is highly probable to vote
for the party using this model, but has a roughly average probability to turn out to vote. So 
we are confident this voter will vote for our party, we just want to try to convince him to 
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actually turn out to vote. We define a persuasion swing voter as a voter who is highly 
probable to vote, but has a roughly average probability to vote for our party. This voter is 
likely to turn out and doesn't have a strong tendency to vote for either party; thus, we are 
hoping to convince him to vote for our party when he votes (Ghani, 2013). We will focus on
turnout and persuasion voters, as these voters can be identified with the data set and 
model we are using.
Unlike presidential elections, congressional elections do not operate on an electoral 
college. That is, the winner of the election is determined solely by who has the greater 
number of votes over the entire district and not by who wins the most towns or precincts. 
Because of this, it makes sense that after updating each individual voter's probabilities 
with aggregate data from their town to pool all of this data together and try to rank each 
citizen on a district wide basis. This allows us to be able to rank each voter based on only 
their pi,2014(vote) and pi,2014(Vote D | Vote) and not have to consider a ranking system for the
different towns in the district.
As mentioned above, we are interested in identifying two separate types of swing 
voters: turnout swing voters and persuasion swing voters. By definition, each of these 
voter types is determined by consideration of both of our probabilities. We implement a 
scheme using both pi,2014(vote) and pi,2014(Vote D | Vote). To do so, we define the following 
two quantities, which, by construction will attain their maximum value of zero when they 
most closely satisfy our criteria to be the type of swing voter we are interested in 
identifying:
ri,turnout = -[pi(vote D | vote) - (p(vote D | vote) + εturnout )]2 - [pi(vote) - p(vote)]2 
ri,persuasion= -[pi(vote D | vote) - p(vote D | vote)]2 - [pi(vote) - (p(vote) + εpersuasion ]2
Here, ri,turnout  is the ranking position assigned to voter i to identify the most likely turnout 
swing voters and ri,persuasion is the position  assigned to voter i to identify the most likely 
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persuasion swing voter. The parameter values are as such: p(vote D | vote) is the sample 
average of pi(vote D | vote), p(vote D | vote) is the sample average of pi(vote D | vote), and
εturnout  and εpersuasion are two positive constants which are used to shift their terms in the 
equation away from their respective averages towards higher likelihoods.
By construction, ri,turnout and ri,persuasion  are non-positive functions that identiy, 
respectively, voters that best fit our definition of turnout and persuasion swing voters by 
having the value closest to the global maximum of this function, which is zero. Recall, for 
example, that for turnout swing voters we want to identify voters with an average chance of
turning out and an above average chance of voting for a given party if they do turn out. 
The first term should be closest to zero when the voter's likelihood to vote for a 
given party if they vote is above average. This gets slightly tricky as our function that 
updates our priors to our posteriors skews are probabilities in such a way that they are all 
drawn closer to the sample average. Particular attentions has to be paid to the data when 
choosing εturnout. Our intuition may tell us that a 75% chance of voting for a given party if 
they vote is above average. However, in our model, the maximum value of this probability 
is 77%, so the 75% actually implies near certainty they will vote for our party. This makes 
choosing εturnout slightly tricky.
More specifically, the minimum and maximum of p i(vote D | vote) closely correspond
to the average value plus or minus only one standard deviation. Setting ε turnout to the one-
third of the standard deviation allows the first term to achieve its value closest to zero 
when a voter's probability to vote for a given party if they vote is closest to the top two 
thirds of the sample. The second term is closest to zero when the voter's likelihood to 
turnout is closest to average, and decreases symmetrically as the voter's likelihood to 
turnout shifts from the average.
 By virtue of our updating method, all of the individual's posterior probabilities are 
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drawn closer to their municipality's average, so the idea of average and above average 
likelihoods are slightly skewed. In our sample, we see the posterior P i,2014(Vote) range 
between 41% and 84% with an average of 55% and the posterior P i,2014(Vote D | Vote) 
range between 49% and 77% with an average of  61%. Consequently, to identify swing 
voters we consider 55% to be average and 61% to be above average for P i,2014(Vote) and 
61% to be average and 67% to be above average for P i,2014(Vote D | Vote).
Since each of our r values attains its maximum when it most closely identifies our 
voter of choice, we can simply sort each voter on either of these values independently to 
determine either the most persuadable voters to vote for a given party or the most 
persuadable voter to vote. This would be helpful in an ideal world where convincing a voter
to vote and convincing a voter to vote for a given party were two fundamentally different 
processes. However, in reality, most campaign workers will not be proficient at either of 
these independently, but, instead, an unknown combination of the two. Thus, identifying 
the overall most persuadable voters will be most useful. Our final ranking is computed as 
follows:
rc, overall = (1-c) * rturnout + c * rpersuasion c  [0,1]∈
This is a weighted average of the rankings of each type of swing voter. The weight, c, can 
be chosen to tend more towards turnout swing voters, persuasion swing voters, or an 
equal weighting of both. For the results below, we chose c = ½ for an equal weighting of 
both types of swing voters. Like our other ranking, the absolute most persuadable voter 
will have roverall = 0, thus a descending sort of voters by roverall gives our final ranking.
5. Results
Now that our model is complete, we can apply it to the data and systematically 
prescribe voting preferences for each voter to identify who the swing voters will likely be.  
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After ranking these voters, we have a clear idea of clusters of swing voters that could 
change the outcome of the election, if we effectively spend campaign resources trying to 
sway them. As Ghani (2013) highlights in his talk, we are aiming for results that are better 
than average, and we have achieved that. Our results don't claim to be accurate 
predictions of each voter's actual preferences; instead, a close enough approximation that 
will lead to useful results once compared to each other via ranking.
Recall that there are two types of swing voters to identify. The turnout voters who 
are very likely to vote for a given party and have an average likelihood to vote and the 
persuasion voters who are very likely to vote and have an average likelihood to vote for a 
given party. Also, recall that due to our updating scheme's tendency to draw the posterior 
probabilities closer to their average, we consider 55% average and 61% above average for
Pi,2014(Vote) and 61% average and 67% above average for Pi,2014(Vote D | Vote).
Due to limitations of the excel spreadsheet used to implement the model, we show 
results for 5 municipalities in the district. Because we aggregate and update on a 
municipality-wide basis, we can divide the district into smaller subsets without the model 
breaking down. This is actually a robust feature of the model because we can adjust the 
model to one municipality, multiple municipalities, or all of the municipalities depending on 
our needs. We chose municipalities of varying population size to highlight that our rankings
are not dependent on the number of registered voters. The specific municipalities chosen 
and their number of registered voters are: Bantam (551); Harwinton (4,406); Morris 
(1,665); Plainville (10,512); and, Waterbury (46,260).
The results presented below assume that we are trying to win votes for the 
Democratic party. The same analysis would apply if instead we were trying to win voters 
for the Republican party, so we do not present those findings. In our model, there are only 
a few different probability pairings for voters in a given municipality, so there will be many 
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voters that share the same voting preferences in a given municipality. These groupings are
a consequence of how we define are prior probabilities. 4 We have ranked the full set of 
voters, but group each of these clusters into bins of a given ranking and show one sample 
voter from each of these bins. The bin sizes vary, but are roughly proportional to the 
number of voters in the respective municipality.  In all of the rankings below, the top 10 
bins account for roughly 10% of the voters in our sample. Specifically, these bins represent
roughly 6,000 voters from our sample of 65,000 voters. To help visualize the overlap 
between results in the different types of ranking, each color corresponds to a unique bin. 
Note that bins with no color appear only in that ranking scheme.
Most probable turnout swing voters
Most probable persuasion swing voters
4 There are only 3 possible values for Pi,2014(Vote) and 4 possible values for Pi,2014(Vote D | Vote). This 
means there are only12 unique pairs of prior voting probabilities for all voters. Our updating scheme shifts
these values in a consistent way for each municipalities, so after being updated, each municipality will 
have 12 unique probability pairs. We are considering 5 different municipalities in our sample, and since 
each municipality has a different aggregate we have at most 60 unique posteriors probability pairings for 
all of our voters.
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VOTER_ID PARTY CITY P(Vote 2014) P(Vote D 2014 | Vote 2014)
52345 DEM Harwinton         0.54 0.69
23485 DEM Morris            0.58 0.67
40525 DEM Bantam            0.54 0.7
452 DEM Morris            0.5 0.67
32405 DEM Plainville        0.58 0.73
6723 DEM Harwinton         0.63 0.69
30526 DEM Harwinton         0.47 0.69
23252 DEM Plainville        0.49 0.73
5624 DEM Bantam            0.63 0.7
34362 DEM Bantam            0.47 0.7
29602 UNA Waterbury 0.59 0.57
VOTER_ID PARTY CITY P(Vote 2014) P(Vote D 2014 | Vote 2014)
52134 UNA Waterbury 0.59 0.57
9234 DEM Morris            0.58 0.67
23452 DEM Harwinton         0.63 0.69
65253 UNA Plainville        0.58 0.53
42456 DEM Morris            0.67 0.67
23452 DEM Bantam            0.63 0.7
58492 DEM Harwinton         0.54 0.69
3450 UNA Bantam            0.63 0.5
17392 DEM Bantam            0.54 0.7
53603 UNA Waterbury 0.5 0.57
Most probable overall swing voters
These results show that there is a fair amount of overlap between the first and 
second ranking scheme, and the results from the third ranking scheme are almost entirely 
of entries from the first two. The results also agree with our intuition that most of the 
turnout swing voters are declared Democrats while a larger number of persuasion swing 
voters are Unaffiliated. This shows that our model helps to identify the true voting 
preferences of an unaffiliated voter, satisfying one of the main objectives of our model. 
With these results, we can now micro-target voters and know where to focus our 
campaign efforts to try to sway the swing vote in our direction and achieve our overall goal 
of winning the election. The results shown here account for roughly 6,000 voters (which is 
roughly 10%) in our district. This provides enough voters to focus on such that we can 
attempt to influence the election, but not so many that the effort becomes intangible. 
Beyond that, the power of the ranking system is that the top of the list identifies the most 
significant swing voters, yet the more resources a campaign has, the farther down the list 
of voters they can go.
6. Theory
This model is not an implementation of any single theory or abstract model, but is 
instead inspired from multiple different theoretical frameworks found in economic, political, 
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VOTER_ID PARTY CITY P(Vote 2014) P(Vote D 2014 | Vote 2014)
49303 DEM Morris            0.58 0.67
14503 DEM Harwinton         0.54 0.69
62810 UNA Waterbury 0.59 0.57
23025 DEM Bantam            0.54 0.7
47289 DEM Harwinton         0.63 0.69
9834 DEM Bantam            0.63 0.7
1293 DEM Morris            0.5 0.67
21203 DEM Plainville        0.58 0.73
34928 DEM Morris            0.67 0.67
32538 UNA Waterbury 0.5 0.57
52352 UNA Plainville        0.58 0.53
and mathematical literature. Rational choice theory and statistical mechanics ideas were 
used to develop the theory behind the model and the framework our voters interact within, 
and statistics and Bayesian inference were used to obtain useful results from our data 
within this constructed framework.
Classical rational choice theory posits that all socioeconomic agents act rationally in
order to maximize their utility in regards to their own self interest. In their treatment on 
social interactions, Christakis and Fowler (2009) highlight that when you apply rational 
choice theory to political science, due to the assumption of rationality, it is very unlikely for 
a voter to vote because the costs associated with voting are too high relative to the 
payoffs. Fowler (2006) explains that since each vote is less and less likely to impact an 
election, the cost to vote strongly outweighs any payoff to the voter derived from affecting 
the outcome of an election; therefore, a low voter turnout is predicted. Empirical results 
contradict theory and show that voter turnout is generally very high.  In his Nobel Prize 
winning paper, McFadden (2001) accounts for disparities between theoretical predictions 
and empirical findings by showing that people do not always act as completely rational 
representative agents, but instead, perceptions of others influence an agent's economic 
decisions.
When local incentive structures and social interaction are more explicitly 
considered, rational choice theory much more effectively explains social phenomena. 
These approaches factor in interaction among agents by incorporating the utility of nearby 
agents into a given agent's own utility function. Now, a voter's utility is not simply a 
maximization problem over his own self interest, but incorporates the utility of  his 
neighbors. Smith, LaGatta, and Bueno de Mesquita (2013) demonstrate an interesting way
to incorporate local incentive structures in voting models. They suppose that the agents 
can win a prize for their district if the candidate they vote for wins. Their consideration of 
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local incentives for their community motivates them to turn out and vote, and this help 
explain a large voter turnout.
Social interaction is playing a larger and larger role in developing economic theory. 
The interaction of agents on an individual scale affects the aggregate state of a system. In 
our model, the actions and interactions of voters on an individual scale have a discernible 
effect on the winner of an election, and this agrees with our intuition. Statistical mechanics 
was developed to describe and draw a link between the microscopic and macroscopic 
states of large physical systems and to explain aggregate phenomenon, such as 
magnetization and changes in state of matter. Durlauf (1999) states: “Just as statistical 
mechanics models explain how a collection of atoms can exhibit the correlated behavior 
necessary to produce a magnet, social science models wish to explain interdependent 
behaviors. The basic idea in statistical mechanics—that the behavior of one atom is 
influenced by the behavior of other atoms—is thus similar to the social science claim that 
one individual’s decisions depend upon the decisions of others; therein lies the possibility 
of a common mathematical structure.” This analogy applies directly to our model when 
considering interdependent behavior among voters. Much more importantly, he shows in 
this paper that the mathematical constructs underlying statistical mechanics do indeed 
hold true in an economic context.
Looking at economics through the lens of statistical mechanics helps to break down 
some of the flaws in the assumption of a representative agent and allows us to account for
heterogeneous preferences in utility maximization problems. Aoki and Yoshikawa (2011) 
present their interpretation of macroeconomics with an emphasize on interaction among 
agents and rely on the mathematical tools that statistical mechanics has established, 
which helps set the context for the use of these models. Bouchaud (2011) presents few 
specific examples of how these mathematics apply to binary choice models. This applies 
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to our model as our voters are faced with a sequence of two binary choice: 1) Vote or 
Abstain; 2) If they vote, vote democrat or vote republican. 
In our model, when updating each individual's probabilities with aggregate data from
the municipality, we implicitly assume that nearby people will have similar preferences. 
This assumption lies at the core of our model and it is the method by which we integrate 
social interaction into each individual's preferences. Contucci and  Ghirlanda (2007) show 
that grouping of voters with similar preferences is a consequence of the statistical 
mechanics framework and justifies our updating with municipality-wide aggregates.
Most of the municipalities we considered have a large number of citizens, so there 
seems to be a natural fit to the large system nature of statistical mechanics. However, 
there are a few smaller municipalities that we work with and our intuition still holds here. 
Lee, Broedersz, and Bialek (2013) shows that statistical mechanics can be used to explain
the behavior of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, even though there 
is a very small number of agents in this system, namely, 9. This paper also presents a very
nice small scale example of determining voter preferences in a context where, due to 
strong party divisions in the Supreme Court, swing voters can also make a large impact on
the final decision of the court.
A more technical exploration of the mathematical components of statistical 
mechanics that apply to economics can be seen in Brock and Durlauf 's (2002) coverage 
of social interaction in economic behavior. They demonstrate, “models which incorporate 
terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behavior of others in an 
environment of non cooperative decision making.” Specifically, they show how the mean 
field version of the Ising model has the same underlying probability structure as their 
economic model that describes the collective behavior of the interacting economic agents. 
We refer to Fedele (2011) to enhance our intuition of the statistical mechanic theory 
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involved in mean field models and applications to collective behavior of interacting 
particles.
Rational choice theory and statistical mechanics applications to economics provide 
a useful framework for explaining the theory behind the model, but we need tools to 
analyze the data and implement the numerical portion of the model. Basic probability and 
statistics allow us to make a first order guess at reasonable probabilities for a given voter, 
but it is Bayes' rule that gives a mathematical sound method for updating probabilities 
based on observed information and intuition. Formally stated, Bayes' rule says:
P(A|B) = P(B|A)*P (A) / P(B)
Here, P(A) is our initial belief, the prior probability, P(A|B) is our belief having accounted for
B, the posterior probability, and P(B|A)/P(B) is the support A provides for B, our updating 
function (Lee, 2012).In use, this allows one to compute the probability of an event to occur 
with the knowledge that some other event has already been observed. 
A more applicable interpretation of Bayes' Rule is present by Lee (2012). When 
properly defined probability distributions exist, Bayesian statistics state that the posterior 
distribution is proportional the prior distribution times an update function:
Posterior Distribution  ∝ Prior Distribution x Update Function
Bayes' rule allows us to change our belief of the likelihood of an event based on 
information we have learned. It is a way to formally revise a probability when new 
observations are made.
Our model relies heavily on the idea of Bayes' rule, but is not an explicit application 
of it. We do not define a proper probability distribution for each voter in our sample, so we 
cannot apply Bayes' rule in its literal format. Instead, we use the idea behind Bayes' rule 
that we can update our probability predictions by adding more information. Bolstad (2007) 
and Kruschke (2010) provide many examples of Bayesian inference that help show the 
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power of this tool. We apply this in our model by establishing our priors in a way that 
seems reasonable. We then, aggregate this information on a municipality-wide basis to 
integrate the social considerations discussed early. Using a a principled approach, we 
update our prior probabilities by averaging them with the aggregate data to arrive at our 
posterior probabilities. 
The averaging scheme employed is where we violate Bayes' rule in its strict sense, 
since it does not preserve the underlying probabilities. This means our posteriors are no 
longer an absolute expression of our voters preference. The power of our model is that this
does not matter. Because we are using a ranking scheme to identify the swing voters, only
the probabilities relative to one another are significant, and our method of updating 
preserves this while still integrating more information into these predictions.
7. Conclusion
In the end, we were able to develop a model that takes a single data set containing 
information on all of the voters in a given district. We were able to use our model to make 
predictions on voting probabilities of these voters, then use a Bayesian themed updating to
make these predictions more accurate by adding further information to them. After 
applying our ranking scheme to the individual voters, we are left with an ordering of all of 
the voters in the district that will be useful in a very practical sense for a political campaign 
that is trying to identify and sway swing voters in the hopes of winning the election.
The model draws insight from multiple ideas and integrates them in a reasonable 
way. Our model does not give realistic probabilistic for each voter. It does make enough 
headway in updating one's likelihood to vote, and importantly, it draws on aggregate data 
to address the important issue of which way swing voters will go.
Building a good model is a very cyclic process. Only after gaining the intuition from 
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completing the model can one look back and have a clear idea where the model could be 
improved. Now that model is done and the work has been thought through, there is an 
excellent opportunity to consider a few areas of improvement that would yield the most 
substantial improvement in the model.
One of the very nice aspects of our model is that we used only one data set 
throughout the project to compute all of our probabilities. We gleaned useful results from 
this data by both using it directly to calculate further information and reexamine the data 
from a different perspective when we aggregated the numbers. An obvious weakness is 
the data set contains only information from a fixed point in time. Data is available for the 
number of voters registered for each election and the turnout for each year. Incorporating 
this data will help address this issue and will better allow us to see how voter turnout 
fluctuates year to year and make a better real world prediction for 2014 voter turn out. That
is, our numbers could be useful on an absolute scale, not just relative to each other. 
Another short coming of our model is that it does not take into account past election 
results. Specifically we do not incorporate any information on the actual vote turnout for a 
given party to help determine which way unaffiliated voters will tend to vote. Our model 
now implicitly assumes that the unaffiliated voters in a town are likely going to align with 
the party to which the majority of a municipality's voters are registered members of. This 
agrees with the theoretical underpinning our model, in that voter's located near each other 
will tend to affect each others' decisions and it could be concluded that they will likely vote 
the same way. However, in many cases, a majority of voters are unaffiliated, so the 
assumption that a small number of voters determines the preferences of a larger 
percentage of voters may be a flawed one. 
Take, for example, Waterbury where 49% of voters are registered Democrat, 12% 
registered Republican, and 39% are unaffiliated. Our model would indicate that unaffiliated
23
voters would vote Democrat. However, looking to average actual election results over the 
last 10 years show a roughly 59% Democrat to 41% Republican split. These results 
contradict our model and suggests that most unaffiliated voters actually vote Republican. 
However, only through a more careful application of Bayes' Rule can we attempt to better 
discern which way unaffiliated voters will actually vote. To do so properly, we need to use 
the following quantities which are known from our model: 1) The likelihood of being each 
type of voter, 2) The likelihood of each type of voter voting for a given party if they vote, 
and, 3) The likelihood to actually vote for each of these types of voters. Importantly, the 
last quantity  needed is the actual percentage of voters that vote Democrat and 
Republican, and establishing this quantity will necessitate incorporate additional data. 
Once found, we can use these values to update our priors in a strictly Bayesian 
methodology to obtain posteriors that more accurately reflect an unaffiliated voter's true 
voting preferences. 
Aside from trying to better update our priors through incorporation of further data, 
the model can be improved by considering further ranking schemes. After all, this is our 
method for determining the voters to spend campaign resources on. Once these other 
rankings are achieved, it would be interesting to look at how similarly they rank each voter. 
A final rank could be constructed as an aggregate of all of individual rankings.
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